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Skill, Practice, and Virtue: Some Questions and Objections
for Aaron Stalnaker
Richard Kim
Department of Philosophy, Loyola University Chicago
rkim7@luc.edu

It is a pleasure to be a part of such great intellectual company in discussing
Professor Stalnaker’s very rich and insightful book. It is practically impossible not to be impressed (and a bit intimated) by Stalnaker’s breadth of
knowledge, deep understanding of early Chinese texts, and keen observations about how the early Chinese philosophers offer intellectual resources
still very much relevant to us today. My comments will focus on the
relationship between skill and virtue. I’ll ask one clariﬁcatory question and
offer two potential objections to Stalnaker’s account.

I. The Connection between Skill and Virtue
Let me begin with my clariﬁcatory question: Stalnaker presents the early
Confucian thinkers as drawing a tight connection between skill and virtue. I
found this discussion both fascinating and important, but I was hoping to get
a bit clearer on just what the connection was meant to be. To ask this
question more crisply, I think it might be helpful to draw on Matt Stichter’s
recent discussion of three different ways of thinking about the relation
between skill and virtue. He categorizes the three kinds of connections as
weak, moderate, and strong. In the weak view virtues are connected to skills
but should not be understood along the lines of skills. The moderate view,
which Stichter claims is Aristotle’s view, “claims that there are structural
similarities between virtue and skill, such that we can gain insight into how
virtues are developed by looking at how skills are acquired.”1 Finally, the
strong view claims that virtues are a kind of skill, a view held by Julia
Annas.2 It seems to me that Stalnaker would endorse the strong connection,
but this is not entirely clear from the text.
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II. Alasdair MacIntyre and Early Confucian Accounts of Virtue
In his discussion of virtue, Stalnaker argues that the way that Alasdair
MacIntyre separates virtue from skill is problematic and that the early
Confucians would have accepted virtue and skill as more interconnected.
One question I have is whether Stalnaker offers a correct account of
MacIntyre’s view about virtue. To be sure, Stalnaker does portray
MacIntyre’s account in a sympathetic light, but re-reading MacIntyre’s
account of virtue in After Virtue made me think that there was quite a bit of
overlap between MacIntyre’s account and the early Confucian account. For
in developing his account of virtue, MacIntyre explicitly argues that
practices such as chess, painting, or playing a musical instrument (the sorts
of activities that Stalnaker would acknowledge as paradigmatically skillful
activities) are internally connected to virtues.
Here is the deﬁnition of virtue MacIntyre offers in the context of
his discussion of practices (note that he reﬁnes this deﬁnition later in his
book):
A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which
tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and
the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods.3

So it seems like the very concept of virtue involves goods internal to
practices. As MacIntyre notes, the practices provide the virtues with their
point and purpose. A virtue, in this picture, is not some kind of moral value
hanging out there, but is closely connected to those all-too-familiar practices
that human beings engage in: “arts, sciences, games, politics in the
Aristotelian sense, the making and sustaining of family life. . . .”4
In fact, one of the most illuminating discussions by MacIntyre is that of
the chess-playing child who begins to play chess for purely extrinsic rewards
(money), but then gradually comes to appreciate the goods internal to chess
that MacIntyre suggests will require the cultivation of certain virtues such as
fairness, patience, and truthfulness. I think this example captures the way
that ordinary practices provide us with the proper occasions for developing
a variety of virtues that are necessary to realize these internal goods. We
can identify in our own lives the achievement of certain internal goods and
how the gaining of these goods required the development of certain virtues.
Even if practices do not exhaust the circumstances under which we cultivate
the virtues (as MacIntyre himself would say), MacIntyre seems exactly right
that to a substantial extent the virtues are cultivated within the context of
various socially embedded practices. My impression is that Stalnaker would
not disagree with any of this. And so it is not entirely clear to me what
Stalnaker ﬁnds problematic about MacIntyre’s account of the relationship
between practice and virtue.
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Moreover, MacIntyre’s account of virtue also seems to agree with at least
two substantial features of Stalnaker’s discussion of the early Confucian
account of virtue: (1) the need to cultivate virtues through the guidance of
good teachers, and (2) the social context and relationships necessary for the
cultivation of virtues. Both points are developed at great length in the book,
and Stalnaker provides a masterful defense of why they are crucial for a
comprehensive understanding of virtue.
I think that MacIntyre also supports both views explicitly in his
discussion of the virtues. In saying this I do not mean that all the
points Stalnaker makes about virtue are already contained in MacIntyre’s
account, which is clearly not true. But I think there is a much deeper
resonance between MacIntyre’s view and the early Confucian view of virtue
than Stalnaker seems to think. Consider the following passages from After
Virtue:
A practice involves standards of excellence and obedience to rules as well as
the achievement of goods. To enter into a practice is to accept the authority of
those standards and the inadequacy of my own performance as judged by
them. It is to subject my own attitudes, choices, preferences and tastes to the
standards which currently and partially deﬁne the practice. Practices of course,
as I have just noticed, have a history: games, sciences and arts all have
histories. Thus the standards are not themselves immune from criticism, but
nonetheless we cannot be initiated into a practice without accepting the
authority of the best standards realized so far. If, on starting to listen to music,
I do not accept my own incapacity to judge correctly, I will never learn to
hear, let alone to appreciate, Bartok’s last quartets. If, on starting to play
baseball, I do not accept that others know better than I when to throw a
fastball and when not, I will never learn to appreciate good pitching let alone
to pitch.5
It belongs to the concept of a practice as I have outlined it—and as we are all
familiar with it already in our actual lives, whether we are painters or physicists
or quarterbacks or indeed just lovers of good painting or ﬁrst-rate experiments
or a well-thrown pass—that its goods can only be achieved by subordinating
ourselves within the practice in our relationship to other practitioners. We have
to learn to recognize what is due to whom; we have to be prepared to take
whatever self-endangering risks are demanded along the way; and we have to
listen carefully to what we are told about our own inadequacies and to reply
with the same carefulness for the facts.6

These passages, together with the deﬁnition of virtue as intimately tied to the
achievement of goods internal to practices, gives rise to a picture that I think
connects substantially with the way Stalnaker portrays the early Confucian
account of virtue as requiring submission to teachers and authoritative
standards, as well as practice within a socially embedded context of ongoing
human relationships.
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III. The Internal Connection between Skill and Moral Virtue
To support the view that there is an internal connection between skill and
moral virtue, Stalnaker draws on a very interesting passage from Mengzi
4B24. Let me reproduce it here in full (using Stalnaker’s own translation):
Peng Meng learned archery from Yi. When he had fully mastered Yi’s way, he
thought in the whole world only Yi himself was superior to him. So he killed Yi.
Mengzi said, “In this case Yi was at fault. [Although] Gongming Yi [a
previous Confucian whom Mengzi respects] said that it seems as if he is without
fault in the matter, all he meant was that his fault was slight. But how could he
be blameless?
[The Duke of] Zheng ordered Master Zhuo Ru to raid the state of Wei.
[The Duke of] Wei ordered Yugong Si to pursue him. Master Zhuo Ru said,
‘I’m so sick today I cannot pick up my bow. I’m as good as dead.’ He asked
his chariot driver, ‘Who is pursuing me?’ His driver replied, ‘Yugong Si.’ Zhuo
Ru exclaimed, ‘I shall live!’ His driver said, ‘Yugong Si is the best archer in
Wei. Why, sir, do you say you will live?’ He answered, ‘Yugong Si studied
archery with Yingong Tuo. Yingong Tuo studied archery with me. Yingong Tuo
was an upright person. His chosen friends must be upright as well.’ When Yugong
Si caught up to them, he asked, ‘Why do you not hold your bow, master?’ He
replied, ‘I’m so sick today I cannot pick up my bow.’ Yugong Si replied, ‘I learned
archery from Yingong Tuo, who learned it from you, master. I cannot bear to use
your way by turning it against you to harm you. Nevertheless, I am here today
doing my lord’s business, which I dare not abandon.’ He drew out some arrows
and knocked off their heads against his chariot’s wheel, then ﬁred off four of them,
after which he returned [to his home territory].”7

The key conclusion Stalnaker draws from these two stories is that “Mengzi
thinks archery is a dao that involves a considerable portfolio of commitments, skills, and virtues, which cannot be separated from each other.”8
But I’m not sure if we can draw this conclusion from either of the
stories. First, take the story of Peng Meng and Yi. What is clear is that Peng
Meng fully mastered or “fully fathomed” Yi’s dao (盡羿之道). Moreover, Yi,
according to Mengzi, was blameworthy (at least partially) for Peng Meng’s
immoral act. But it’s not clear why Mengzi still couldn’t fully accept that Yi
was a master archer qua archer but not a fully virtuous or upright person.
Insofar as archery is considered, Mengzi could still claim that Yi was a true
master, but that doesn’t mean that Yi was a truly virtuous person or a junzi.
In fact, it seems that the dao of Yi that was transmitted to Peng Meng was
really just the dao of archery or the skillfulness of this particular craft. (We’ll
see a reason to think this below.) But it seems plausible to think that Yi was
less than a fully virtuous person and lacked certain virtuous qualities. It
might be either that Yi had certain vices himself, or that he lacked sound
judgment about the character of others.
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It seems to me even less clear that the second story is suggesting that
archery and virtue are closely connected. First of all, Master Zhuo Ru
comments that Yingong Tuo was an upright person (端人) and therefore his
chosen friends must also be upright. Of course, Master Zhuo Ru turns out to
be correct and that Yugong Si really is upright. But there is no suggestion
here that the skill of archery itself is at all connected to the upright
characters of either Yingong Tuo or Yugong Si. There is ﬁrst of all the very
natural reading of this passage in which Yingong Tuo seems to have chosen
Yugong Si as a friend and taught him archery because he was already an
upright person. (Stalnaker concedes that this is a real possibility.) Perhaps
even more signiﬁcant is the comment by Yugong Si when he decides not to
kill Master Zhuo Ru: “I cannot bear to use your way (我不忍以夫子之道) by
turning it against you to harm you.” But this comment suggests that the way
or dao of Master Zhuo Ru refers strictly to the skill of archery, and that it is
this particular skill that Yugong Si cannot bear to use against Master Zhuo
Ru. This also seems to imply that the skill itself could have been used to kill
Master Zhuo Ru, and therefore perform a bad act. What impeded Yugong Si
from doing this, of course, is that he is upright, not that he is a master
archer. To connect this point to the early story of Peng Meng and Yi, since
the way (dao) in this second story is only referring to the particular technical
skill of archery, it seems that we ought also to interpret the dao of Yi in this
way as well.
Of course, what I have said doesn’t show that Mengzi or other early
Confucians did not see a tight link between skill and virtue. All I’m
suggesting is that we do not get that view from these passages.
Notes
1 – Matt Stichter, “Virtue as a Skill,” in Oxford Handbook of Virtue, ed.
Nancy E. Snow (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), p. 58.
2 – Julia Annas, “Virtue as a Skill,” International Journal of Philosophical
Studies 3, no. 2 (1995): 227–243.
3 – Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Virtue, 3rd ed.
(Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), p. 191.
4 – Ibid., p. 188.
5 – Ibid., p. 190.
6 – Ibid., p. 191.
7 – Here I am working with Aaron Stalnaker’s own translation of the
Mengzi in Mastery, Dependence, and the Ethics of Authority (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2020), pp. 135–136.
8 – Ibid., p. 137.
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